O¤shoring has lately received wide attention. Its potential e¤ects, mainly to be materialized in employment and productivity dislocations, are yet to be fully assessed.
Introduction: De…nitions and controversies
Recent times have been witness to a seemingly new and innovative way of doing business: o¤shoring. Usually o¤shoring presents itself with some degree of outsourcing, so it is not di¢ cult to …nd real-life combinations of both business practices. Undeniably, all the media noise that exists is constantly trying to set new trends around the subject and reshape the way of doing business in general. Occasionally, it is even changing the way policy-makers address the issue in fear of political backlash. News about millions of jobs moving abroad can indistinctively cause alarms to go o¤ clamorously in the political arena, or the animal spirits to start shaking the economy unnecessarily in the private sector. We have thus more than a serious reason to believe that numbers and estimates are to be looked on with special care. Indeed, with o¤shoring the observer can change the object he or she observes. 1 Consequently, it is most important to measure o¤shoring properly, especially for what it might represent for labor markets around the world. We are then interested in producing several measures using di¤erent known indices at the country level for a signi…cant group of countries, and for a recent period (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) .
Yet new in its coinage, the truth is o¤shoring and its close cousin outsourcing have for long been among us. In fact, they can be traced back to an idea widely used in economics: comparative advantages. If we de…ne o¤shoring merely as job relocation outside the national boundaries in search of lower wages, we can see how this comes eventually to exploiting comparative advantages through cheaper labor force and cost savings. More precisely, o¤shoring refers to the geographic location where the service or production takes place, whereas outsourcing responds to the ownership of the means of production (in-house or third-party). In this way we come to be familiar with such terms as "o¤shore outsourcing" (or international outsourcing) and "in-house o¤shoring". These can also be referred to as o¤shoring in the broad and narrow sense, respectively.
As policy-makers, if we were left to decide whether our national production should be carried out abroad while local workers move to the pool of unemployed, we might as well think twice. However, if we were to foresee increases in domestic productivity due to o¤shoring-related activities, we might face a more hopeful scenario instead. Indeed, productivity gains for those companies engaged in any form of o¤shoring could translate into price discounts and a boost in their product demands, thus a¤ecting employment positively. But how long would it take for the companies to seize the bene…ts, if any? And more, would an early setback predispose people in general to see o¤shoring as a real threat?
Noticeably, the productivity and employment e¤ects of o¤shoring have so far occupied most of the economics literature. On both these e¤ects empirical works have successively failed in providing with de…nite and unambiguous answers. Even though the subject in general remains unsettled, some consensus has at least been reached when it comes to measuring o¤shoring to a certain level of aggregation. This is no easy task as we will show later.
We therefore address di¤erent questions that have been somehow covered by the literature. We …rst wonder about the relation between o¤shoring and country size. Are larger countries the bigger o¤shorers? Do they show a signi…cant tendency towards this practice, globally? News reports put the stress on large developed economies like the US, and the huge amount of workers soon to become unemployed. But are these numbers really important for such countries? Apparently not, and more, relatively small countries …nd themselves among the bigger o¤shorers worldwide.
2 Further, what is the importance of o¤shoring depending on the economic sector? Are manufacturing industries more prone to go o¤shore than their services counterparts? This is very much related to the next question: what are the intensities of both materials and services o¤shoring? Has the …rst wave of production (materials) o¤shoring abated, just to make room for a second wave of services o¤shoring?
The numbers do not seem to say so, at least for the moment. Even though growth rates in services o¤shoring are much larger than those of materials during the period 1995-2005, their levels are still far below of what one would judge as signi…cant.
Here we set ourselves to the endeavor of bringing out to light a review about the most utilized indices in the literature, and their application to aggregate (country) data. The outline of the paper goes as follows: section 2 deals with the problems of measurement and describes a series of widely used indices; section 3 displays the statistical data on o¤shoring worldwide, making use of the indices and stressing the di¤erence between industries (manufacturing or services) and between forms of o¤shoring (materials or services); section 4 concludes.
Measurement
How then to de…ne o¤shoring when it comes to empirics? In other words, how to proxy its theoretical de…nition quantitatively? Roughly speaking, o¤shoring can be measured either directly or indirectly. Nevertheless, the lack of reliable o¢ cial records should make us consider indirect measures to a greater extent. Similarly, given the research objective and the data constraints we might want to look at country, industry, …rm, plant, or even individual worker level data. 
A word about data quality
In this modern age of ultrafast communications words often lose their meanings and numbers can go wrongly interpreted. A pernicious yet natural side e¤ect of globalization, it compels us to seek further into the available data and get a clearer picture of the phenomenon. Raw data are sometimes not easily accessible, and the little we may get usually hides certain relevant facts. Before going over the di¤erent kinds of measures that could better proxy o¤shoring through indirect indicators, we should mention the sources and their reliability. Kirkegaard (2007) breaks down the sources into three empirical hierarchies. The lowest tier encompasses all the estimations and projections by consulting companies. These reports (Forrester, 2004, and McKinsey, 2003 , for instance) seek to set up new trends thanks to their continuous feedback with the private sector, yet turn out wanting in their methodology and of limited scope most of times. Selection bias in the interviews conducted, and thus lack of representation of the small samples produced, are commonplace in these studies. A notable example is that by Forrester Research (2004) , which forecasts the grandiloquent …gure of 3.3 millions of US jobs to move abroad by the year 2015. But this is peanuts if compared with the 160 millions of jobs projected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the same year, and the 35 million already created during the last decade in the US labor market.
Second-class data belong to the estimates elaborated by the press, mostly resorting to public and veri…able sources. Once all is settled and ready to go companies normally announce it publicly as part of their marketing campaign. However, in later times and because of a higher negative reception that makes o¤shoring a synonymous of job loss, companies feel more reluctant to publicize job shifts to foreign countries. Related to this, politicians'attention also dims in close connection to the electoral cycle. Mankiw and Swagel (2006) unearth a clear pattern of the ups and downs of o¤shoring and outsourcing in the four major US newspapers (Fig. 1, p. 1030) . Seemingly, interest awoke sharply before the 2004 election, just to go back to previous levels right afterwards. All in all, yet not perfect, press releases make up a more objective group in this data hierarchy. The report presented by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (2004) is a good example.
Finally, the series of indirect measures we discuss below place at the top of this ranking. As shown there, o¢ cial country records and international organizations of renown like the IMF or the OECD, all supply the raw data needed to develop a reliable indirect measure of o¤shoring. Although the academic research so far lags behind that presented by the other two sources, recent times have shown to be fairly productive and with many research possibilities.
Aggregate indirect indicators
Before jumping into the indirect indicators, a comment on measuring o¤shoring directly need be made. Gauging o¤shoring directly proves to be a hard task to take on, if not impossible. Just to imagine what it would take to come up with a direct and comparable index for all industries (not to mention all …rms) conveys the feeling of an enterprise which is hopeless from the outset. The scarce o¢ cial data and the ambiguous understanding of the subject pose the principal obstacles. The OECD exhaustive report (2007) lists most of the known measures, direct and indirect, yet as we will see the latter turn out more suitable (or feasible) for research purposes.
Proposed direct indicators of o¤shoring, either in its broad or narrow de…nition (and equally valid for production of goods and services), deal chie ‡y with data on production, number of employees, FDI, exports, and imports. The point is to make out the changes in any of these variables due to relocation of workers. We should keep in mind that creating new foreign jobs alone without reducing the domestic activity does not represent o¤shoring or outsourcing. Likewise, a job lost because of domestic outsourcing is necessarily gained in another sector of the domestic economy and, therefore, not part of the de…nition. This same report goes over a vast catalog of drawbacks in using direct measures to assess the impact on the labor markets. Apart from the fact that some data might overlook drops in the number of jobs accountable to o¤shoring, other important limitations do exist. According to the OECD, some of these might be: changes in the classi…cation of …rms, problems of con…dentiality, subcontractors gone abroad with their clients, and successive small-scale relocations.
Now we move on to examine the main indirect indicators proposed in the literature. An important decision the researcher so often faces is that of choosing the aggregation of the study. This is a bit arbitrary since the more in detail we go the more we would expect, for example, to …nd a negative relation between employment and o¤shoring in the short run. 4 Further, more aggregate …gures could hide certain industries or companies which show a higher inclination to o¤shore. These are commonly referred to as aggregation and sector bias, respectively. On the other hand, when looking at …rm or establishment data it is important not to lose sight of the ownership status. We can see how, especially at this level, o¤shoring measures abound and are not that homogeneous.
Perhaps more than in other empirical ventures, data availability here poses a serious drawback. Especially if the goal is an international comparison of the reach of o¤shoring, then the homogeneity of the data remains of most importance. Therefore, we next consider the industry level measures, which can be easily aggregated to the national level. These industry measures have been conceived in the …rst place, and somehow have set a trend in the recent literature.
A benchmark contribution is Feenstra and Hanson (1996a , 1996b , 1997 . There, o¤shoring is de…ned as the share of imported intermediate inputs in the total purchase of nonenergy inputs. They combine US import data from the four-digit SIC (Standard Industrial Classi…cation) with data on material purchases from the Census of Manufactures. The census data crisscross the trade between industries of the same level and provides the base for estimating the share of intermediate inputs in every industry. For a given industry, multiplying its input purchases from each supplier industry times the ratio of imports to total consumption in the supplier industry, and then adding over, turns out in their o¤shoring measure. More formally, it can be written as follows:
where I j is purchases of (material) inputs j by industry i, Q is total inputs (excluding energy) used by i, M j is total imports of goods j, and D j their domestic demands. Here, domestic demand (or the consumption of goods and services j) can be measured as shipments + imports -exports, removing the trouble of developing a de ‡ator for the value added. This formula provides an index of the o¤shoring intensity at the industry level. It proxies the import content of intermediate trade of industries which, in turn, proxies their o¤shoring intensity. Speci…cally, the …rst term in (1) stems from the census data (or input-output tables), while the second term, which is an economy-wide import share, is obtained from the trade data. Conveniently, this expression serves as a measure for both the traditional o¤shoring of materials and the more fashionable o¤shoring of services, yet former works have con…ned their analysis to materials alone. Besides, it is useful to split o¤shoring into its narrow and broad measures. The narrow measure restricts to imported intermediate inputs from the same two-digit industry whereas the broad measure includes all other industries as well. Also the di¤erence between the broad and narrow measures, which represents all imported intermediate inputs from outside the two-digit purchasing industry, appears as an alternative when it comes to capturing the true nature of o¤shoring.
Importing trade stands for an important amount of intra and inter…rm trade nowadays. It is then a fair proxy of o¤shoring while data are relatively easy to …nd. However, a common drawback to all measures relying on imports and import shares is that o¤shoring does not necessarily imply an increase of imports, or vice versa. In e¤ect, if a local exporting …rm decides to move part of its production abroad and continues exporting it from a foreign country this would not translate into a drop in imports to the parent …rm. Rather, it would represent a fall of its exports. Also, a rise in a country's imports due to more favorable terms of trade should not be linked to an expansion of o¤shoring from local …rms. Hence, it is the composition of trade and the share of intermediate inputs in particular, what matters in the end for such economic aggregates as wages and employment. Convincingly, "trade in intermediate inputs can have an impact on wages and employment that is much greater than for trade in …nal consumer goods" (Feenstra and Hanson, 2001, p.1) . Remarkably, many of the latest Heckscher-Ohlin-type trade models with a positive welfare e¤ect of o¤shoring (yet ambiguous e¤ects on factor prices) take Feenstra and Hanson's analysis as a starting point.
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Campa and Goldberg (1997) put yet another spin to the story. They de…ne an index of "vertical specialization" for several countries, underpinning the share of imported inputs embodied in production, but now remarking the increasing verticality in international trade. Through this they try to assess the extent to which multiple stages are traded for di¤erent products, using input-output tables that include sector-level data.
with m j being equal to the share of imports in consumption of industry j, p j q j the value of inputs from industry j used in the production of industry i, and Y the value of total production of industry i. Hummels et al. (2001) further develop the measure of vertical specialization just to account for the imported input content of exports at a country level, using the OECD inputoutput database for a sample of several countries. A clear interpretation of the concept of vertical specialization is provided in …gure 1, p. 26, of their paper. Moreover, they employ for the …rst time the imported intermediates to be found in input-output tables, thus avoiding the estimation of the imports content of inputs (as in Feenstra and Hanson) . This is what we do in our analysis below.
These authors conceive their de…nition as imported inputs used only to elaborate products to be exported afterwards, which is tantamount to say "the foreign value-added embodied in exports". A modi…ed formula for the industry level would be then:
where m j represents imported inputs j by industry i, Y is the gross output of industry i, and X j are total exports of goods and services j. So if industry i uses no imported inputs or if it does not export its output, V S 2 i = 0. Moreover, since the composition of trade is what matters, in the aggregate the expression is normalized by total exports. As customary in the formulation of these measures, the authors make use of input-output tables distinguishing foreign and domestic sources, value-added, gross output, and exports. An extended version of V S 2 would also include imported inputs used indirectly in the production of goods and services, as in V S 1 .
Another group of indices brings out the participation of imported inputs in total production. An example is the narrow measure by Egger and Egger (2003) , which includes only intermediate goods imported from abroad and produced by the same industry classi…cation back in the home country. They construct a measure of o¤shoring or "foreign outsourcing" from Austria to Eastern Europe, employing Austrian input-output matrices:
where A is the total volume of national and international outsourcing of industry i, and both B and C appear as weighting terms for A. More precisely, A is the intraindustry trade in intermediate goods and services either from domestic or foreign suppliers. Meanwhile, B represents the imports openness of industry i while C stands for the share of imports from Easter European countries in overall imports. The "cross-border outsourcing" variable (OI it ) is then expressed as a ratio to the gross production of industry i, and not to total inputs purchased by industry as in Feenstra and Hanson. To summarize, a clear-cut classi…cation of o¤shoring indices into three categories could be the following: those considering the share of imported inputs in total inputs, those highlighting vertical specialization, and those considering the share of imported inputs in gross output. All these measures are usually estimated at certain level of aggregation (country or industry), 7 yet the literature has recently taken a widespread plunge into disaggregate data that takes the analysis away from input-output tables. Of course, it is to expect that future research around these measures will be more dehomogenized, as a result of an increasing share of studies being conducted at a rather disaggregate level. Examples of these three indices are, respectively, equations (1), (2), and (3) above. Broadly speaking, all existing measures at the industry level would fall to some extent into one of the three groups mentioned. Horgos (2008) considers two additional measures that we do not reproduce here: indices considering imported inputs in total imports, and those considering the value added in production. He shows how, for Germany, these two perform rather poorly in a comparative study that takes all …ve types of indices. We undertake a similar decomposition analysis below to gauge the suitability of the proposed indices for our country data.
In their simplest expressions, and upon availability of intermediate inputs data, equations (1) and (3) can easily be reduced to:
where OI Q it and OI Y it are the o¤shoring intensity indices expressed as ratios in terms of total purchases of intermediate nonenergy inputs and total production. In particular, when i = j they become the narrow measures, and the numerator in (4) is simply the diagonal element of the import-use matrix.
Most of times it is not possible to use such simple expressions as in (4) in an extensive time period. Input-output tables are periodically published around every …ve years and remain one of the few direct sources for m (imported intermediate inputs) so far. That is why the numerator in (4) is usually estimated through trade data, as in (1) and (3). Despite this empirical shortcoming, we rely exclusively on variations of formula 4 to come up with our statistical analysis.
Statistical analysis: A world overview
We present country evidence from calculations based on the indices reviewed above, using the OECD input-output tables for the years 1995, 2000 and 2005 (the latest tables available). As stated before, aggregate …gures could hide industries or companies showing a higher propensity to o¤shore. We are aware that this further aggregation (from the industry to the country level) entails a higher degree of potential bias, but our aim is to produce indices that are at the same time good proxies and comparable among countries. Since our main concern centers on o¤shoring, we should be noting that the subject of inshoring, that is, foreign …rms relocating subsidiaries domestically, is left out of the present study (see here Amiti and Wei, 2005) . Thus, we turn to answer several empirical questions.
The …rst step is to see if some pattern emerges as regards o¤shoring and countries'relative sizes, as done previously by Hummels et al. (2001) and Amiti and Wei (2005) . At …rst we would suspect industries in larger and more industrialized economies to be relatively more prone to go o¤shore. However, as found in both mentioned references, here too o¤shoring intensity (as proxied by relative trade in intermediate goods) turns out inversely related to country size.
Distinguishing the extent to which manufacturing and services industries engage in o¤-shoring with a di¤erent intensity proves also of interest. Traditionally, …rms belonging to the manufacturing sector have been more inclined to o¤shoring due to the kind of activities they mostly undertake (e.g. manufacture-related activities which were initially easier to move abroad).
Another step towards a further understanding of the phenomenon is the separation between materials and services o¤shoring. This connects directly with the previous point, and the evidence so far suggests that services o¤shoring, yet growing exponentially, is still on its …rst stages. This we corroborate below.
We analyze the evidence for these three empirical questions in the following sections. Additionally, we take a deeper look into services o¤shoring as it has been argued to be the ultimate manifestation of modern trade (Mankiw and Swagel, 2006) . Finally, we provide a decomposition analysis that intends to compare the performance of the di¤erent indices.
O¤shoring intensity and country size
We construct a ranking for the years 1995, 2000 and 2005, for a wide sample of countries, on which input-output tables from the OECD are available (tables A1 to A6). Three indices are reported, as de…ned earlier: imported inputs in total inputs, imported inputs in gross output, and a measure of vertical specialization. 8 The narrow measure considers only international trade among industries of the same classi…cation as a proxy of in-house o¤shoring. This corresponds to the diagonal in the import use matrix. The broad measure stands in turn for all trade, intra and inter-industry and, thus, for a rough proxy of o¤shore outsourcing or international outsourcing. It is usually believed that the former better captures the general idea about o¤shoring, yet the literature has reached no de…nite answer on this point. Needless to say that the broad measure is, by de…nition, always bigger than the narrow one, since the numerator of the index is always bigger for the former. As seen in these tables, smaller economies (e.g. in GDP terms) rank among the …rst ten according to the three indices, narrow and broad. This really comes as no surprise, since all these indices belong to the series of openness measures well known in economics, where larger countries display in general smaller indices. This is naturally so because larger economies produce a greater amount of inputs than smaller ones, thus curbing the relative extent to which the former are engaged in international trade. Therefore, smaller countries rely more strongly on o¤shoring as a form of international trade than their larger counterparts, in relative values. Countries like Luxemburg, Ireland, Hungary, Taiwan, Austria, Slovak Republic, Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovenia are some …ne examples. On the other hand, some of the larger economies perform consistently at the bottom; namely, the US, Japan, China, India, and Brazil. Right in the middle of this ladder we …nd a varied group of large countries among which Germany, Canada and Spain stand out. It is also possible to identify Italy and the UK swinging around the average for all three indices.
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Changes in the rankings are of little signi…cance, either among indices or when moving from narrow to broad measures. This is not that much the case when we analyze the change, in relative terms, which took place from 1995 to 2005 (tables A7 to A9). A few of the larger economies now show themselves as having undergone a steep expansion of o¤shoring during that recent period, like in the US, Spain (only for [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] , and Germany. Surprisingly, China, Brazil, and Japan portray a signi…cant positive change during the period 2000-2005. We can see how, incidentally, the pattern shown by these latter countries coincides with a signi…cant liberalization of their trade in recent times, most importantly for China.
It would not be reasonable however to try recognize a trend for the countries of the sample, since we only have data for three points in time. Despite the gained prominence in latest years, such larger economies as the US, China, Brazil, India, or Japan, are still far from compromising important shares of their intermediate trade to foreign sources (e.g. o¤shoring). Remarkably, though, Canada, Germany and Spain stand perceptibly aside.
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The reason for this performance on these three countries remains veiled to us, yet we may venture a logical explanation. In all cases the country of origin (or source country) is right at the border of a vast and open market which is, either very close geographically, or culturally, or both. A trading partnership between Canada and the US dates back to the …rst days when both nations were born. One should presume that Canadian and US …rms are easily relocating across the border, yet as it turns out it seems relatively more signi…cant for Canada. Similarly, Germany and Spain …nd unbeatable opportunities in Eastern Europe and Northern Africa, respectively. More, one is not to forget about the tremendous business opportunities that Latin American countries o¤er to Spanish …rms. Yet not sharing the same border, both territories do share a cultural background that for times allows a better entrepreneurial understanding.
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Generally speaking, we can see how global o¤shoring (the world weighted average) grew remarkably during the period 1995-2000 for any measure considered, yet less dramatically for the period 2000-2005. This loss of momentum was more strongly perceived among narrow measures (e.g. in-house o¤shoring), perhaps as a result of entrepreneurs being now more con…dent on working with specialized third-party providers. As we de…ned o¤shoring, 9 Remember that all these indices are constructed assuming that both the values of the numerator and denominator refer to the same price level, thus avoiding the use of di¤erent price indices. 10 The …gures for Germany are very similar to those in Horgos (2008) , who relies on German data alone, taken from the German Socio Economic Panel. For instance, his broad measure for 1995 and 2000, when weighting for total inputs, stands at 15 and 19 percent respectively. When weighting for output these indices are 6 and 8 percent. Our data shows the following: 14 and 18 percent (table A2), and 7 and 10 percent (table A4) . Furthermore, growth rates in his data and ours are also alike.
its recent upward trend should not be surprising, since trade is an ever-growing result of globalization and capitalism. All in all, o¤shoring appears as the natural outcome of international trade on which smaller countries seem to rely relatively more often, in order to survive and integrate into the world economy.
O¤shoring intensity and economic sector
Here we would like to approach an answer to the following question: which economic sector (and by extension, what kind of …rms) o¤shores the most? What we do again is sorting out the sample of countries for the same years as before, but now doing speci…c mention to two separate economic sectors. In particular, for every country we divide the whole set of industries of the OECD I-O database into manufacturing and services industries. 12 We resort to the same three aggregate indices, both in their narrow and broad versions, to account for this description. We discover that the manufacturing industries are more heavily engaged in o¤shoring activities than the services industries (tables A10 and A11); the sample (weighted) mean gives us a clue. For some countries the di¤erence is rather important as to make the services sector look like it does not engage in international trade at all. This is more easily seen for the narrow measure. For example, in Argentina, China, Greece, and the US, the o¤shoring intensity of the manufacturing sector is, in general, overwhelmingly superior to that of the services sector. When considering the broad measure the picture is now fairly homogeneous, with the intensity in manufacturing industries only doubling or tripling that of services industries, for the whole sample.
A reasonable explanation for this gap is that the services sector still lags behind (e.g. the three-sector hypothesis) in developing a proper infrastructure or the particular knowhow, as it has for long being the case in the manufacturing industries. This sounds odd for developed economies with mature high-tech industries and a strong investment in R&D, but there, too, the growing services sector commits a tiny share of its intermediate trade to international providers. We must also not forget that most services have other services as their intermediates, and services are in general far less tradable than goods. Therefore, all three indices underlie the so-far less relevant importance of o¤shoring for services industries, something that holds true for both the narrow and broad measures. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, there are still a great number of potentially o¤shoreable services that might eventually account for larger …gures. But when will this take place we cannot say.
As for the countries'relative size, the same pattern emerges here as before, yet it turns out less evident in the manufacturing sector. Small economies stand at the top in both the manufacturing and services sectors, and for both the narrow and broad measures. Also, several of the fully developed economies now appear among the most intensive "o¤shorers" in this more in detail breakdown. It is worth mentioning Canada, Belgium, Austria, the Netherlands, and the Nordics for the manufacturing sector in both the narrow and broad measures. In turn, for the services sector, narrow measure, we should mention the same group but adding Germany, whereas for the broad measure the display is now less disperse. Among the larger economies we should point out how rather disappointingly turn out some of the performances, namely: the US, Japan, China, Brazil, and India. Their indices are way below the average.
If we look at the sample mean it is easy to recognize a positive change from 1995 to 2005, for all the measures considered. The short span of time for which we can produce the series of indices should prevent us to make any further consideration on the evolution of the phenomenon. Enough to say that, with the exception of some outlier, the presence of o¤shoring is consistently and signi…cantly more important in the manufacturing than in the services sector. As we shall see below, this di¤erentiation between sectors is tightly related with the classi…cation of materials versus services o¤shoring. Naturally, manufacturing industries have occupied themselves more with materials o¤shoring, while services industries have followed suit with services o¤shoring. Here it is the "use" of the input we are interested in, as opposed to the "origin" of the input, which is what we study in the next section.
Materials versus services o¤shoring
The di¤erentiation between materials and services o¤shoring has not attracted the economists' attention until very recently. Here we refer to the type of activities or functions o¤shored instead of the economic sector where these practices originate. Seemingly, services o¤shoring should be qualitatively di¤erent due to the relative impracticability it faced in the past. This was the outcome of, …rst, the lack of mobility of the resources involved, and later, the fear for the potential loss of control of the implementations relocated abroad. But new communication technologies (specially the Internet) are boosting a whole new way of doing business and thus using the available resources more e¢ ciently. Right now, whitecollar workers do not seem particularly con…dent about the former impracticability of a prospective relocation of their jobs.
We present similar indices to those used earlier, but now calculating the import penetration in production of two types of inputs: materials and services. This is done according to the classi…cation of industries but now applied to the foreign industry where the input was produced. In particular, grouping all input contributions by foreign manufacturing industries to a domestic industry gives the material o¤shoring index for that industry. After weighting for each industry's output we have the country's index of materials o¤shoring. In the same manner, grouping all the foreign contributions in services provides the services o¤shoring index which, after weighting, becomes the country's services o¤shoring index. 13 It is clear that services o¤shoring still represents, with a very few exceptions, a small share of intermediate trade for a vast majority of countries (table A12) . Again, country size (in GDP terms) appears as a determinant of o¤shoring intensity according to the di¤erentiation between materials and services. As for materials o¤shoring we do not see a large dispersion of the indices. As for services, smaller countries like Luxemburg and Ireland take the lead, followed by far by the Slovak and Czech Republics, Estonia and Hungary, among the lesser developed, and Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Taiwan, and the Nordic countries, among the more developed ones. On the other end, the US and China call the attention for the little relative weight that services o¤shoring signi…es for the total economy.
As argued in the previous section, we should not be surprised about these numbers, since it is to expect that each sector of the economy would focus more intensively on o¤shoring of related activities. Despite the relative lack of signi…cance of services o¤shoring, we must point out the potential impact it could have in the longer run. The larger positive change of the world (weighted) average proves the increasing importance of these practices usually associated with higher value added activities.
14 Most of the countries experienced a real upgrade in this sense, independently of their level of development. Also, for some countries it is possible to observe that the rise in services was accompanied by a fall of materials o¤shoring (Luxemburg, Ireland, the Netherlands, among others). As discussed earlier, as better and faster communications make their way in the globalized world economy, a growing number of jobs becomes o¤shoreable overnight. Every task that could be put through a wire is now at risk of being moved abroad in search of comparative relative advantages. For this reason, it is of major importance to look deeper into this kind of o¤shoring which might be determinant for so many workers and their families. The future might otherwise be giving us an unpleasant surprise, perhaps sooner than expected.
Services o¤shoring: Impending revolution?
If services o¤shoring really holds the key, we should be looking more seriously at the industries contributing the most during the past few years. Presumably, services o¤shoring entails higher value added activities, and thus, a greater potential for growth. We can expect that, a priori, services o¤shoring should be concentrated on industries belonging to the services sector. This is in fact what we observe for years 1995 and 2000 (see table A13 ).
The services o¤shoring indices for each industry are presented as the weighted mean taken 13 To our knowledge this speci…c index was …rst introduced by Wei (2005, 2006) . We are unable to produce a narrow measure since we do need to account for the origin of the inputs in several foreign industries, either in the manufacturing or the services ones. The index reported in table A12 is therefore a broad measure of the Feenstra and Hanson type, meaning that it is not restricted to trade between …rms of the same industry classi…cation.
14 Canals (2006) …nds a similar pattern for services o¤shoring for the US.
among all the countries of the sample, thus providing an approximation to the phenomenon at the industry level worldwide. So if a revolution, whatever its extent, is to be expected, it will have to take place most certainly in the services sector. See how especially important turn out all the transport-related industries, followed by …nance and insurance, post and telecommunications, computer services, and other business activities.
To check on the possible e¤ect of this new prominence of services o¤shoring on the industries considered, we look at the associated rates of employment growth in the period 1995-2000 (table A14) . In doing this, we combine the OECD I-O data with the STAN (structural analysis) database, also from the OECD, and obtain a restricted sample.
15 Because of this, we should be careful in drawing comparisons between tables A13 and A14. For whereas the former tries to stress the major role of services o¤shoring in services industries as a worldwide phenomenon, the latter speculates about a possible pattern between the international growth rates of services o¤shoring and employment. Seemingly, the growth in services o¤shoring related positively to the growth in employment during the period 1995-2000. This is far evident in …gure A1 (the counterpart of table A14), where we present the scatter plot and take the liberty to draw a regression line. Convincingly, …ve years appear as a reasonable time to capitalize the employment bene…ts. However, we ought to be a bit cautious about this. First, we only consider a limited sample on which data were available; therefore, we should cast some doubt on the representativity of the sample. Second, even though we weight the change in the industry means worldwide by the countries'outputs, these …gures might yet hide some rather disparate data. And third, high aggregation of the industrial classi…cation, as argued before, might as well obscure the picture even more.
The little evidence we air in this section is by no means an irrefutable proof of services o¤shoring to translate into employment gains in the midterm. We can risk, however, that this new wave of o¤shoring implying higher value added activities does not pose an immediate and severe threat in terms of job losses. We should now go over the assessment of the indices studied up to this point so we can decide which one behaves best. 
The quality of the indices
We now carry out a decomposition analysis over time (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) and across countries of the indices so far studied and for both the narrow and broad measures. This analysis involves following the conventional "within" and "between" exercise to account for variations in, 15 The countries for which the data were available from both databases were: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the US. This is nearly as half as what we had previously. 16 In tables A12 to A14 and in …gure 1 we have already made up our minds and picked out the formula in (4a), that is, the index which makes reference to imported inputs in total inputs. In the next section we see how this index performs reasonably well.
respectively, industries'o¤shoring intensity and their shares in total production. 17 What we set out to do is a decomposition of the variance of the di¤erent indices: imported inputs in total inputs (MII), imported inputs in gross output (MIO), and the vertical specialization index (VS). Through this we should be able to isolate the changes in the o¤shoring intensities within industries from the changes in their production shares. Therefore, to see to what extent the indices describe the phenomenon accurately, we proceed to extract the sources of growth behind all three indices making use of the data in tables A1 to A6 and the following expression:
where the change in the o¤shoring index of countries ( ) is decomposed, throughout industries (i), into the change in the o¤shoring intensity (the within term) and the change in the share of total production (the between term). The former …xes the structural component of industries, also the share of industry output to total output ( ), 18 to focus on the change in the o¤shoring intensity ( ). The latter, contrariwise, …xes the o¤shoring component, thus capturing the contribution of the structural component to the change in the index.
19
Tables A15 to A17 display the results of the decomposition analysis. The within term corresponds to the …rst right-hand term in (5) and the …rst column in the tables. The between term is, in turn, the second right-hand term in (5) and the second column in the tables. The overall change in the indices ( ) is presented in the column labeled as "total", and is equal to the sum of the within and between terms, as shown in (5). The overall change here coincides with the change, in percentage points, in the indices in tables A1 to A6. For example, let us consider the changes in the MII index for the US during 1995-2005 (tables A1 and A2, narrow and broad measures respectively). These changes amount to 0.34 (the di¤erence in table A1) and 3.02 (the di¤erence in table A2) percentage points, which are the values we obtain in the column "total" of Finally, the last column in these tables is the "within to total" ratio, and gives us an idea of how accurate the indices turn out to be. The closer it gets to 100 percent, the more the change in the index is purely explained by o¤shoring. For all of them the broad speci…cation performs indeed more accurately when considering the global average, that is, after taking 17 See Hummels et al. (2001) , Strauss-Kahn (2004), and Horgos (2008) , who also undertake decomposition analyses along these lines. 18 Output refers here to gross output, as often found in the literature for this kind of analysis (see Horgos, 2008 , for instance). Moreover, for the vertical specialization index the structural component is di¤erent: the share of the industry's exports in total exports.
19 A bar over the variable de…nes the mean for the period under study.
out possible outliers. We should however remain wary about these numbers since they are just rough averages, with the sole purpose of providing an intuitive understanding of the accuracy of the indices.
Concluding comments
O¤shoring as a relative new phenomenon is not just some food for the media. Rather, it is a manifestation of the increased mobility of production factors and a reinterpretation of the concept of comparative advantages. Numbers on the subject abound, but most of times they are mindlessly brought onto the debate as though wanting to stir feelings of uneasiness among the audience. The predictions tend to be much the same: bad omens loom in a future not so far away. The truth is, however, that a consensus on what these numbers really mean has not yet been reached. In the economics literature, at least, it has become usual to consider the intermediate trade as a ways of approaching a more rigorous de…nition. In fact, this sort of trade amounts to an important share of the current total trade for industries, to the point of a¤ecting the relative demand for di¤erent kinds of labor more than the trade in …nal goods. This, for some (Feenstra and Hanson, most representatively) , becomes a factor-bias technological change since it favors skilled employment over unskilled employment. With this as a background we have …rst reviewed the most common indices in the specialized literature, pointing out the exhaustiveness shared by all of them. Then we have used these same indices to produce a snapshot of the phenomenon worldwide during 1995-2005, at a country level.
Our empirical analysis throws some light on widely held preconceptions. First, o¤shoring is not all about large and highly developed economies relocating jobs in far-o¤ countries. Despite the fears held by many in these large and in ‡uential economies, the evidence suggests that o¤shoring is a widespread phenomenon. Furthermore, according to all our indices, smaller economies rank consistently among the most intensive o¤shorers, in relative terms (tables A1 to A6). This is in part as a result of our proxying o¤shoring through intermediate trade. The growth rates show however a signi…cant increment during 1995-2000 for some large economies (tables A7 to A9).
A second matter we address in the paper has to do with the di¤erence in magnitude for two broad sectors of the economy: manufacturing and services. The numbers here make it clear that o¤shoring still holds a stronger grip in manufacturing industries. A …rst wave certainly took place in the manufacturing sector worldwide back in the 1960s and 1970s when it became necessary to compete with foreign producers. Moving production workers abroad was then possible as well as needed. But with the further improvement of communications and the birth of the Internet, a second wave of o¤shoring focused on the services sector has come to be. The evidence picks up this change somehow, especially for our broad measures (tables A10 and A11). Nevertheless, o¤shoring intensity has increased independently of the sector, so it does not appear that o¤shoring in the services sector had proportionally gained much terrain.
The next point deals with the di¤erent kinds of o¤shoring. Naturally, this relates with the previous point. In terms of the indices here presented, we are now interested in the type of input being imported whereas, previously, we inquired about the destiny of the same input. However, here the growth rate of the world (weighted) average seems signi…cantly higher for services o¤shoring (table A12) .
We therefore need to take a closer look at services o¤shoring. For this we present a breakdown of the industries, noticing that in e¤ect services o¤shoring concentrates in services industries (table A13) . Moreover, industries at the top traditionally imply a relatively high value added that could eventually transform in growth and employment. In turn, we show the growth rates in the services o¤shoring intensities for every industry considered with their associated growth rates of employment (table A14 and …gure A1). Not surprisingly, fast growing industries like "Finance and insurance", "Computer and related activities", or "Other business activities", experience high rates of both services o¤shoring and employment.
As a concluding exercise, we carry out a decomposition analysis on the reviewed indices that suggests a certain preference in their use (tables A15 to A17). In particular, broad measures perform better than narrow ones. On this account, we can recommend the use of any of the broad measures here discussed, which provide with a close approximation to the true nature of o¤shoring on highly aggregate data. 
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